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ADMIRALTY-TORTS-A PERMANENTLY MOORED VESSEL
LOCATED IN NAVIGABLE WATERS, THOUGH No LONGER INVOLVED IN
COMMERCE, SUPPLIES THE NECESSARY MARITIME NEXUS FOR
INVOCATION OF ADMIRALTY TORT JURISDICTION USING THE
"LOCALITY PLUS" TEST.
On September 26, 1971, plaintiff was injured while an invited guest of a club
which was holding a party on the defendant ship Star of India. It was alleged
that the injury was sustained while plaintiff descended a metal stairway serving
as the only regularly maintained access from shore. No reason was given why
the fall occurred or the extent of injuries. The defendant ship was permanently
moored' in North San Diego Bay and served as a museum to allow interested
persons to view the accomodations of her nineteenth century passengers. 2 She
had not been engaged in commerce since at least 1923, and was not subject to
the Coast Guard inspection and navigation laws, having been classified by the
Coast Guard Officer in Charge of Marine Inspection as substantially a land
structure in March, 1969. Having been admitted that no diversity jurisdiction
existed,3 the sole issue raised by defendant's motion to dismiss was whether
the suit was properly within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of California.4 Held, motion to dismiss
denied and motion to strike on grounds of immateriality denied. A vessel,
although permanently moored, removed from commerce for more than forty
years, and not subject to Coast Guard inspection and navigation laws, supplies
the necessary maritime nexus for invocation of admiralty tort jurisdiction.
Luna v. Star of India, 356 F. Supp. 59 (S.D. Cal. 1973).
Article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution gives the federal
judiciary power over maritime torts, but says nothing as to the substantive law
to be applied in such cases,' causing Mr. Justice Holmes' statement that "...
the precise scope of admiralty jurisdiction is not a matter of obvious principle
or of very accurate history"' to retain much significance. Some concrete obser-
vations can be made concerning the invocation of admiralty jurisdiction, how-
'Coast Guard inspectors accepted the evaluation that the moorings were of a permanent nature
and could not be removed without tools that would be unavailable "to the ordinary mischief
maker."
'The Star of India was constructed at Ramsey in the Isle of Man in 1863. In 1923. she was towed
to San Diego for preservation as an historical relic, but no significant restoration was begun until
1959. Owned by the Maritime Museum Association of San Diego, the Star of India has since
served as a museum and is the oldest merchant vessel afloat.
328 U.S.C. § 1332 (1948).
128 U.S.C. § 1333 (1948) provides that district courts shall have original jurisdiction of "any
civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction." This section has been generally taken to mean
that admiralty tort jurisdiction depends upon the locality where it occurred, not upon the nature
of the tort. Chapman v. City of Grosse Point Farms, 385 F.2d 962, 963 (6th Cir. 1967).
'G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 40 (1957) [hereinafter cited as
Gilmore].
'The Blackheath, 195 U.S. 361, 365 (1904).
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
ever. It may be said with certainty that admiralty is supposed to serve the
national interest by providing a uniform means of supervising the maritime
industry.7 Uniformity in this area has proven to be a necessity for the transac-
tion of commerce among nations, and, at the time of the writing of the United
States Constitution, the founding fathers recognized the need for consistency
in dealing in international trading markets." Uniformity could not have been
ensured by looking to state courts under the Articles of Confederation, so a
separate federal system emerged,' becoming in our law the sole separately
created judicial tribunal for the policing and supervision of a single industry. 0
Ideally, the jurisdiction should relate directly to the business of commerce
conducted on navigable waters, and it should remain flexible and grow as
commercial necessity so dictates." However, most attempts to determine the
limits of admiralty jurisdiction have been undertaken not on the basis of practi-
cal commercial maritime significance, but rather on the basis of historical and
metaphysical concepts. 12
Almost unanimously, American courts have relied to some extent on the
strict locality test in determining admiralty tort jurisdiction. 3 The strict local-
ity test is basically stated to mean that the tort must occur upon navigable
waters to be considered maritime and within admiralty jurisdiction." In deter-
mining whether the tort is maritime in nature, courts have viewed the term
locality as meaning where the negligent conduct occurred, where the actual
injury took place, or where the result of the negligent conduct first came to
rest.' 5 These factual determinations have led to inconsistent locality decisions,
causing the most important aspect of admiralty tort jurisdiction-i.e., uniform-
ity-to be distorted. 6 DeLovio v. Boil, 7 the first test of the constitutional
requirement of federal judicial power over maritime cases, developed a double
standard for maritime problems. English admiralty law had put all land-made
7Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique and Suggestions, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 259, 261 (1950)
[hereinafter cited as Black].
'Note, New Guidelines for Admiralty Tort Jurisdiction, 48 IND. L.J. 87 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Note].
'Id.
"Black, supra note 7, at 260.
"McGuire v. City of New York, 192 F. Supp. 866, 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); "Briefly, the admiralty
jurisdiction . . . extends to all waters, salt or fresh, with or without tides, natural or artificial,
which are in fact navigable in interstate or foreign water commerce. Gilmore, supra note 5,
at 28-29.
"Black, supra note 7, at 266; In The Blackheath, 195 U.S. 361 (1904), the Court concluded the
basis of admiralty jurisdiction could be located by historical glances at English and French law.
"
3Peytavin v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 453 F.2d 1121, 1122 (5th Cir. 1972); see
Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959). See also Grant Smith-
Porter Ship Co. v. Rhode, 257 U.S. 469, 476 (1922).
"Chapman v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms, 385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967); The Admiral Peoples,
295 U.S. 649, 651 (1935); O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36 (1943).
"Note, supra note 8, at 92; see G.H. ROBINSON, HANDBOOK OF ADMIRALTY LAW 77 (1939).
"4Id.
"17 F. Cas. 418 (No. 3776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
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contracts outside of admiralty jurisdiction, thus greatly restricting this jurisdic-
tion, but Justice Story, feeling the restriction was not necessary, held in
DeLovio that locality was not the test for contract cases, and jurisdiction was
determined by "the maritime relation of its subject matter."'" However, he
considered the determining factor in deciding whether a tort fell under the
admiralty jurisdiction as being the location where the tort occurred. 9
Full impact of the locality test, however, was not felt until the Supreme
Court was presented with The Plymouth.9 It was held that admiralty jurisdic-
tion was not proper regarding damages to a wharf caused by a fire initiated
on board a ship. Even though the damage was clearly caused by a maritime
source, the Court held that because the damage was inflicted upon land, the
claim was not within admiralty jurisdiction. 2' The Plymouth has served as a
foundation for many subsequent cases which have seemingly held location as
strictly controlling-i.e., if the tort does not occur upon navigable waters, it is
not within the admiralty jurisdiction, 22 and if it does occur upon navigable
waters, regardless of its connection with maritime activities, it is within admi-
ralty jurisdiction. 23 By reliance on the basic doctrine of strict locality, courts
have been unable to attain the goal for which admiralty was initially formu-
lated-a special tribunal geared to the smooth functioning of international
commerce. By referring to an arbitrary locality rather than to the practical
relation of commerce to the sea, the strict locality test causes results which are
in many cases contrary to the declared goals of admiralty jurisdiction.2 5
Although the fact remains that courts have relied on the strict locality theory
in reaching decisions on admiralty jurisdiction, in reality, as the commentators
note, jurisdiction has very seldom been upheld on the basis of locality alone.21
When no maritime connection or nexus was available, federal courts normally
have refused to take admiralty jurisdiction. 7 In Atlantic Transport Co. v.
Imbrovek2 the Supreme Court, when asked to determine whether locality
alone would support admiralty jurisdiction, skirted the issue by saying merely
that if additional factors, other than the locality of the wrong, are needed to
'"Id. at 444.
'9d.
2070 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1866).
2
1Id.
'Victory Carries, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 205 (1971); Stamp v. Union Stevedoring Corpora-
tion, II F.2d 172 (E.D. Pa. 1925).
'
3Davis v. City of Jacksonville Beach, Florida 251 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Fla. 1965); King v.
Testerman, 214 F. Supp. 335 (E:D. Tenn. 1963).
"Palaez, Admiralty Tort Jurisdiction- The Last Barrier, 7 DUQUESNE L. REV. I, 36 (1968).
"Black, supra note 7, at 264.
2 Smith v. Guerrant, 290 F. Supp. 111, 112 (S.D. Tex. 1968); Peytavin v. Government Employees
Insurance Co., 453 F.2d 1121, 1123 (5th Cir. 1972).
'Smith v. Guerrant, 290 F. Supp. 111, 112 (S.D. Tex. 1968); See Campbell v. H. Hackfeld &
Co., 125 F. 696 (9th Cir. 1903). The first departure from the strict locality test was made in this
case,
29234 U.S. 52 (1914).
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give the federal courts jurisdiction, the relation of the wrong to maritime
service, to navigation, and to commerce on navigable waters were quite suffi-
cient.29 The broader question of locality was not determined by the Supreme
Court until 1972 in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland30 (see
infra p.243). An additional restriction on the strict locality test was the exten-
sion of land doctrine, eliminating from the admiralty jurisdiction injuries oc-
curing on bridges, piers, etc.3 The rule, as stated in Hastings v. Mann, 2 is
".. . the structure must be firmly attached to the land. A vessel moored to a
dock does not become an extension of the land nor do other structures secured
to the shore by cables, or other temporary means.' ' 3 Various other exceptions
to the strict locality rule are also apparent.3 4
Recently, however, a steadily growing minority of courts have tended to
disregard strict locality in favor of the locality plus test of admiralty tort
jurisdiction A5 Rather than give mere lip service to the strict locality test by
basing the decision on the situs of the injury which clouds the real issue behind
admiralty tort jurisdiction, this test focuses on the fact that it is a relationship
to maritime activity and not locations that should be considered by the admi-
ralty court. 3 Location standing by itself should be deemed irrelevant, and only
the continued existence of the maritime industry should be considered, 37
thereby requiring tort claims involving noncommercial users of navigable wa-
ters to be adjudicated by fully qualified land jurisdictions. The feeling of these
courts has been that, completely lacking a commercial interest, these cases have
no need of a uniform system of law, and the burden should be on the tort law
of individual states, where adequate remedies would certainly be available.38
The attitude appears to center around the idea that to do otherwise ". . .would
do violence to the concepts of admiralty jurisdiction when viewed as a total-
ity."3 9
"
1Id. at 61.
'409 U.S. 249 (1972).
MT. Smith & Son, Inc. v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179 (1928): Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co. 395 U.S. 352 (1969).
32340 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 963 (1965).
33340 F.2d 910, 911 (4th Cir. 1965).
31The Admiralty Extension Act of 1948, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1948), broadened the strict locality
of The Plymouth to ". . . include all cases of damage or injury, to person or property, caused by
a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that such damage or injury be done or consummated
on land ... ;" the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1920), was extended to injuries to seamen on land
in O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36 (1943).
"
5McGuire v. City of New York, 192 F. Supp. 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Chapman v. City of Grosse
Pointe Farms, 385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967); Smith v. Guerrant, 290 F. Supp.l II (S.D. Tex. 1968);
Peytavin v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 453 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1972); Executive Jet
Aviation v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
'Pelaez, supra note 24, at 2, 3.
37Id. at 42.
31Comment, Torts Along the Water's Edge: Admiralty or Land Jurisdiction?, 1968 U. ILL. L.F.
95, 103 (1968).
"Chapman v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms, 385 F.2d 962, 966 (6th Cir. 1967).
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In McGuire v. City of New York," a bather was injured while in the waters
along a public beach. The district court held that the injury was not a cause of
action recognized in admiralty, as the claim alleged ". . .an ordinary tort...
no different . . . than if the injury had occurred on the sandy beach along the
water line."'" To attempt to try the case in admiralty would be "... to misin-
terpret the nature of admiralty jurisdiction."42
A similar situation was to be found in Chapman v. City of Grosse Pointe
Farms,4 where a claimant was denied access to admiralty when he dove from
a pier into eighteen inches of water. Admitting that under the strict locality test
the action would indeed be proper in admiralty, the court held that "...
jurisdiction may not be based solely on the locality criterion. A relationship
must exist between the wrong and some maritime service, navigation or com-
merce on navigable waters.""
Perhaps the culmination of the process of limiting access to admiralty tort
jurisdiction by use of the locality plus test can be found by reference to the 1972
fifth circuit case of Peytavin v. Government Employees Insurance Co. 4 and the
1972 Supreme Court case of Executive Jet A viation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland.46
In Peytavin, which "appears to have finally set out a test which enables accur-
ate jurisdictional classification," 47 the plaintiff, unable to show diversity of
citizenship, sought to invoke the district court's admiralty jurisdiction for inju-
ries sustained in an automobile accident when his vehicle was hit in the rear
end by that of the defendant's. Plaintiff was parked on a floating pontoon at a
ferry landing waiting to purchase tickets to board the ferry when hit by the
defendant. The district court dismissed the suit, holding that it was wrongfully
brought in admiralty by virtue of the land extension doctrine." The Court of
Appeals affirmed, although for different reasons. After reviewing various cases
in support of different theories,4 9 the court enunciated the rule that to invoke
admiralty tort jurisdiction, a substantial connection with maritime activities or
interests must be shown, and the plaintiff did not meet this burden.
In Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland,50 involving the crash of
a jet plane into Lake Erie due to the ingestion of sea gulls into the plane's
engines, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals for
4"192 F. Supp. 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
"Id. at 871.
'11d. at 872.
0385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967).
11d. at 966.
"1453 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1972).
4409 U.S. 249 (1972).
"Note, supra note 8, at 87.
40341 F. Supp. 1286 (1971).
"The court credited the Chapman case for the locality plus test, but said the case rested on the
idea of a sufficient minimum maritime connection, causing confusion as to what in fact would be
termed sufficient. 453 F.2d 1121, 1126 (5th Cir. 1972).
' 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
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the Sixth Circuit dismissing the action for lack of admiralty jurisdiction."' In
contrast to Peytavin's substantial maritime connection, the Supreme Court in
this case determined that there must be ". . . a significant relationship to
traditional maritime activity."52 Mr. Justice Stewart, delivering the opinion of
the Court, said the strict locality test was ". . . established and grew in an era
when it was difficult to conceive of a tortious occurence on navigable waters
other than in connection with a water vessel, ' 5 3 but difficulties with the test
are found in ". . . cases where the maritime locality of the tort is clear, but
where the invocation of admiralty jurisdiction seems . . . absurd. 5 4
The court in Luna v. Star of India5 5 accepted the proposition that the locality
plus test "appropriately governs." 56 The question that remained before the
court was whether the plaintiff ". . . alleged a sufficient maritime nexus to
bring her suit within the ambit of admiralty jurisdiction.1 57 Despite the evidence
before the court that the defendant ship had been ". . . withdrawn from com-
merce for some forty years and . . . exempted from compliance with the
inspection and navigation laws by the Coast Guard, and in view of the owner's
express intent to maintain her as a maritime museum . . . "'I the court found
her to be considered a vessel within the statutory definition of 1 U.S.C. § 359
The court found it interesting to note that the supervisor held himself out to
be the "Master""0 of the ship, and felt that although she contained maritime
artifacts, her main function was to allow visitors ". . . the unique experience
of trodding the decks and inspecting the lofty rigging of this old sea voyager."',
Rejecting the contention of the defendant that the Star of India was function-
ally not a vessel because of having been withdrawn from commerce and naviga-
tion, the language of I U.S.C. § 3 that a vessel is ". . . every ... water craft
. . . capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water" was consid-
ered controlling, due to the fact that plaintiff was merely a visitor on board
the ship. Had the question been whether the plaintiff was a seaman for purposes
51The 6th Circuit held that "... the alleged tort in this case occurred on land before the aircraft
reached Lake Erie .... " thus, consideration of ". . . the question of maritime . . . nexus
discussed . . ." in Chapman was not necessary. 448 F.2d 151, 154 (6th Cir. 1971).
S2409 U.S. 249, 268 (1972).
5
:
3 d. at 254.
'Id. at 255.
1356 F. Supp. 59 (S.D. Cal. 1973).5 Id. at 63.
51d.
:8ld.
5
"The word 'vessel' includes every description of water craft or other artificial contrivance used,
or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water." Id. By finding the Star of India
a vessel, the court held that a sufficient nexus would be present, using Judge Dawson's reasoning
in McGuire, 192 F. Supp. at 871: "Admiralty was the result of commerce on the high seas; the
commerce made possible by sailing vessels . . . In very general terms, admiralty . . . . relates to
things occurring on or to vessels or as a result of the employment of vessels." 356 F. Supp. 59, 63
(1973).
:0"In this court's experience, museums are run by curators; ships are run by masters." Id. at 66.
11d.
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of the Jones Act,6 2 the stricter definition of vessel found in 46 U.S.C. § 713
would have been applied by the court.6" Being thus considered a vessel, the
district court found that the necessary maritime nexus for the invocation of
admiralty tort jurisdiction was present.
The court in Luna had an excellent opportunity to supplement the results of
Peytavin and Executive Jet and further limit the scope of admiralty tort juris-
diction by strictly construing a maritime nexus as contemplating a substantial
or significant relation to maritime commerce. Circumstances surrounding
Luna were sufficient to show that there was no actual relation to such com-
merce. The significant factors necessary to show this were admitted by the
court. The Star of India had been removed from commerce for more than forty
years, permanently moored, and classified as a land structure by the Coast
Guard. Invocation of admiralty jurisdiction was not called for in this case. The
state courts are fully qualified to handle a tort case of this type since there is
no connection to the original purposes of admiralty and the need for a uniform
system of law in this case becomes unnecessary. The move by courts away from
the strict locality test is realistic and proper, but unless courts reasonably
construe what constitutes a maritime nexus so as to act practically rather than
artifically in these situations, the problem evident in Luna will continue to
plague admiralty jurisdiction and will effectively emasculate the more progres-
sive locality plus test.
E. Bruce Mather
6246 U.S.C. § 688 (1920).
3
"The term 'vessel' shall be understood to comprehend every description of vessel navigating
on any sea or channel, lake or river." Revised Statute, § 4612 [46 U.S.C. § 713 (1946)].
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